Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5208ac01e7a63e8e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

102.6 KB Created: 2020-12-10 04:58:10 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-05
MD5: eb01cfb2679d21adce061fe2f0081224 SHA-1: 2d651c82ae97a948d41797688371857b12f283a8 SHA-256: 5208ac01e7a63e8ef594d5c7f4c1e579f4aae1032a6a8ef6099057bfade0cbd8
186 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file was identified as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV, indicating a phishing or malware distribution attempt. It functions as a link farm, containing numerous external URLs pointing to disposable hosting services, likely to obscure the ultimate destination or host malicious content. The PDF's structure and embedded links suggest it is intended to lure users to malicious sites, potentially for credential harvesting or further payload delivery.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9996

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffset.ru/strik?utm_term=dbz+majin+buu PDF link annotation
    • https://ruvetuse.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134618438/bitiwi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://safasisi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134472516/sijejinakaludul.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zifujotali.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134310407/xajepiw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sirawomaperuli.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398091/dasumave.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kagixopobexumel.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134648921/fca401930d5c68.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jevezorubik.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134864628/9720869.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fozegujulukov.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134459046/c6c994ee0dd.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ruzunaxatan.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134340268/4758000.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://luwinititik.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134587042/1802587.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kutesavakelex.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134336058/vekipexinafako-mamokuvamaxixom-dukuraniboduto-pafusirijeto.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://volexerakonoza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134713377/nemejigenise.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/99edc1cd-509a-444c-bc8a-b7415441f6d7/amharic_alphabet_download.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000137f0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x137F0 9352 bytes
SHA-256: 51674130245b014cb91133aab655ec9377d0dc18cbf32c53eb7754ac08a9b8ff
font_01_sfnt_off0001571a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1571A 4788 bytes
SHA-256: 7e819646f268f15c709961c85fd13ae64c49d6440493adc6cb6d5a185dfeeafc
font_02_sfnt_off00016762.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x16762 11516 bytes
SHA-256: 4605e789b902cf6c245e49bf32fc204f812227095b1ec51174f61dbddef0e2c6

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