Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 52080ae0c955a3e2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.4 KB Created: 2020-08-14 10:28:30 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 401417baa177b29d09056e6ce36f4fbc SHA-1: d5b2995660b67bb2b54f6eab56db5aa430a876ef SHA-256: 52080ae0c955a3e28a898e1666ec1918fed444d63ab843805eebd353940d340d
128 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains multiple embedded links, with one identified as a malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains a reference to the malicious URL. The presence of a "download button" heuristic further supports the lure-based attack pattern. The primary malicious IOC is the redirector URL, which likely leads to further malicious content.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=chromebook+apps+vs+android+apps
    • http://files.kscoastie.net/uploads/1/3/2/7/132712514/debuzu.pdf
    • http://files.roanokecommunityco-op.org/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740978/7457488.pdf
    • http://files.drbeccasbackyardbiology.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131071072/vewotelas-lomenufusebo.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/4557/7116/files/98851028097.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/2393/2311/files/cervicalgia_que_es.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/6656/4507/files/78860641922.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/4295/5687/files/zitudojura.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/5327/7589/files/random_numbers_c.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/1488/1433/files/44342491822.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/3393/6547/files/by_laws_sample.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/1269/1867/files/dabimulukavufulawulu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0684/4315/files/diferena_entre_infeco_bacteriana_e_viral.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/2417/7576/files/relagurizafupekiwiz.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/4960/7590/files/nogerunesosuxusi.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000064d5.bin
19c99a81c6ac43e5a855c437496f0b200b6b226cdc829988e35af3a55151a619
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x64D5 5336 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000076cf.bin
c537c593ae5ea985277ecc0494f6645d5ae568c6b3ef36be17c5d8f7888ca087
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x76CF 9984 bytes