Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 51f95a3b91e86a6f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

967.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-10-25
MD5: 5d10b9a1d74cc7755cc1112fe68839a3 SHA-1: dcf138c529c05b8e1ad80c68dd1bdfba8da2ff5e SHA-256: 51f95a3b91e86a6fa508e5a4081f49fdd749bcb88c4432f71321e5b0b2cbdb57
312 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The sample contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This object contains a secondary PDF payload which, in turn, has a direct link to an executable or archive. The VBA macros are present but do not contain executable statements, suggesting they are not the primary execution vector. The embedded PDF also exhibits parser evasion techniques.

Heuristics 9

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EDX) high SC_GETPC_CALL
    x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EDX)
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
588daa9dc3df10435a0f8c809de81eacbeba71c1d4e3dd08e75f187a774e92be		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD00014995/OLe10NatIVe 1398 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0005ea00.pdf
336bef262f57d4d1d0d26dfd3d3b3f276bb3886a39ba121f0d1f0d531ea9f662		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x5EA00 602624 bytes
stream_004_off00005d60.bin
2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x5D60 252488 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001200.pdf
c00351ead201c3aa4b4502afc827ba2a947fbf88225c287945c705c3a24b28df		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1200 985600 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006600.pdf
e003b679701022110d79cc9bcd911db47521597226182d3092c592570826b95c		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6600 964096 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00029600.pdf
46099ba189fd325c044281ef11235d42a6f39a862e1d24dc283138ddc49842b5		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x29600 820736 bytes

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