Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 51ec1677b6c48bf9…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

28.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 77af618f3d95a9a9752aa82b51e06a78 SHA-1: 32ee28a920b3cb3e341b843202e0bd08cdf806eb SHA-256: 51ec1677b6c48bf9b2c9bdd547985fa38aab08b64088cc44ae571e2ab654c0f4
68 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing indicates the OLE file is weaponized using a URL Moniker to exploit CVE-2017-0199. The embedded URL, http://______-----------------------@3324947722/166/Pic____IMG00900600707070550060606070704405045405040.hta, is likely used to download and execute a second-stage payload. Although VBA macros were present, they contained no executable statements, suggesting the exploit relies on the OLE vulnerability itself.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker weaponized URL — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE exact CVE_2017_0199_WEAPONIZED_URL
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://______-----------------------@3324947722/166/Pic____IMG00900600707070550060606070704405045405040.hta�aܨ�9��M������Br#كE����k�[D��t�?ɭ�p�3��g��y-�zQ]E-UԈu�I���XE�E_E2���f�b�����m�����$TtN4uw2BakVcgJsAdJA8r1Ooqf7U2ZYNnm8Q02zci5QREUyfLy0FWPKLRNGCftg5ZSiaWGhSBZwdhsQYU5bp7X8cvj6JoAYg2bNNiwrTTl45m7l8COd7y6Ep5qWXjvnQ3yS76ls5vFV1Qb2ZDyU�RȐ^�u���

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes