Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 51e60bcdcaee1c3d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

99.7 KB
MD5: 1f400725b5b6ee6342d0654b4274b39d SHA-1: ca13121883708005b036f7ea3697335b3155c7ae SHA-256: 51e60bcdcaee1c3d406ae23b0e4e78835bc2820157c2d3d19ffe92f71ed02731
136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a PDF file that exploits the CVE-2010-0188 vulnerability in Adobe Reader. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. The PDF contains XFA forms with executable scripts, indicating a deliberate attempt to leverage this exploit. No specific malware family was identified, but the exploit vector is clear.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
0fde45a6e9ab3525952ccd9b771b8ee843728713d3443cd7d5ca04cc9b0a3ba1		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 101388 bytes

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