Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 51af5788fd21a1f9…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

109.4 KB Created: 2020-04-08 21:15:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: 7e5b82a540e1244e752b6aa74c4c5bfe SHA-1: 227831d788809f4cd44c1d57a7923790a47fec9c SHA-256: 51af5788fd21a1f9b86cda6685eda2bec08b89f2e90af5ee3f3d4263168f53f9
228 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The OOXML document contains VBA macros, specifically an Auto_Close macro, which is a common technique for executing malicious code upon document closure. The critical heuristic firing for URLDownloadToFile indicates that the macro attempts to download a second-stage payload from a URL. The GetObject call is also indicative of malicious VBA activity. While no specific URLs were extracted, the presence of these indicators strongly suggests a downloader or droppper functionality.

Heuristics 8

  • URLDownloadToFile in VBA critical OLE_VBA_DOWNLOAD
    URLDownloadToFile in VBA
  • Auto_Close macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE
    Auto_Close macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • External relationship medium OOXML_EXTERNAL_REL
    External target in word/_rels/settings.xml.rels: new:13709620-C279-11CE-A49E-444553540000
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
21975847a851adda105ee34c28654c5f8eca049d86b35e524f10d5444b377a7c		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1282 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
f1472850e79fd8ba797f22f5e5fdea045cb158041b7b91c32d1819bfba55fc6b		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 408576 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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