Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 51a520c58f9cc8f2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

99.7 KB
MD5: fed9822b458b4af080c0283fef222b5e SHA-1: 45fe5cf4fc994f6716c0e5460620a3301089833e SHA-256: 51a520c58f9cc8f2a5ebaa2c7d92165aa57fc6d91bb0b4433fcdddbf03f340da
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is a PDF file that exploits CVE-2010-0188, a vulnerability in Adobe Reader's handling of XFA forms. This exploit allows for arbitrary code execution. While no specific script was extracted, the presence of an embedded file and script payload marker indicates a likely downloader or dropper functionality. The embedded URLs, though mostly benign or unknown, are typical of documents attempting to establish communication or load further resources.

Heuristics 5

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
aadc6d13ba43b0ea819f39c760fa6a801669d73f57a14f25c9e9e4c58687af37		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 101314 bytes

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