Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 518f1f214fc69d86…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

250.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2026-03-21
MD5: 7cc8d457164522d7e671165af6c24f6a SHA-1: 4d8d9375899f1925234a911d8b9c707e506eb758 SHA-256: 518f1f214fc69d862820e4b5453e52967a3cb42a08f04830270e1b29bda955b6
108 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The critical heuristic firing for CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE indicates the file contains a payload exploiting this specific vulnerability. The presence of an Equation Editor OLE object further supports this. No VBA macros were found to be executable, and the document body was heavily truncated and unreadable, suggesting the primary attack vector is the embedded exploit rather than social engineering via document content. The exploit likely leads to the execution of a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
eb5ec2638b677bab9f068d69363a56d01bc0e55650af221eff414a0be9bcfb56
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0031F517/oLE10nAtIve 1877 bytes