Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 517eb00d2c56a5f1…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

87.2 KB
MD5: 10c55ac6b300e7e64a787ecd1ee95de5 SHA-1: d958db330fc03846193371c52ec959ef3f310705 SHA-256: 517eb00d2c56a5f1f083dcf451664a95cd3732ba4335792dddacb0ed12111613
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE object data, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive indicates that the embedded object will be activated automatically. This suggests the document is designed to exploit CVE-2017-11882 to download and execute a secondary payload, likely from the URL http://www.example.com/payload.exe.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002030.bin
c90575ba322fb8e1f3dde6e45048f84e65a986c65a1aaa257540184cc0383454
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2030 2008 bytes