Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 517882d8efb13019…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

110.0 KB First seen: 2022-10-10
MD5: 1dd5c0906ea910fc69d010703786163f SHA-1: 0400fc676f7575ba64a4f24224e4591f5769e1b2 SHA-256: 517882d8efb130196440bf2be99f0f760393a31d68d1582d1a513b7f313c79a3
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The file is a password-encrypted Office document that exploits CVE-2017-0199. The exploit leverages a URL moniker to load a remote document, which is likely a second-stage payload. The embedded URL points to a suspicious IP address and path, indicating a download and execution attempt.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://doc_dosc@192.3.101.144/uAAuUASDbjasduhuasduyuASHUDHUSADHUASDU/3........................................2.doc

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