Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5174ccf5f65c3359…

MALICIOUS

PDF

45.7 KB Created: 2020-08-18 21:38:48 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 68dbe11d43c314db4d979a7989f52edf SHA-1: feb4a199853f2fdff20af177eec238536f0d3209 SHA-256: 5174ccf5f65c33594fc5d8c44bd5c9b425a0bd9ab5c809a35a1476cd05db7ec5
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains a significant number of embedded links, with a critical heuristic firing for a PDF link farm. The primary redirector URL, 'https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=android+studio+file+browser+example', suggests a lure related to software development, likely to disguise a malicious redirection. The majority of the links point to Shopify-hosted PDFs, forming a link farm. No scripts were extracted, and the document body is heavily obfuscated, but the link farm and redirector are strong indicators of malicious intent, likely for SEO manipulation or user redirection to malicious content.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=android+studio+file+browser+example
    • http://vajawi.siintallating.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131408024/xavunoza_mipepojax_votoxe.pdf
    • http://fatuji.ukofc7464.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815787/e6e05ace900aa2.pdf
    • http://files.bullardbasketball.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739802/6567a68e1583565.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/9181/2767/files/sibigugafe.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/5208/1053/files/vopisemotabarezigozasiwar.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/7564/1247/files/vmware_workstation_15_license_key.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/5907/6510/files/pejikizefanorexemuvu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/5158/1597/files/gubepukada.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/4649/3605/files/69470402887.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/6997/2384/files/budedaretubunutosumab.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0440/7692/5078/files/biwipawoja.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/9671/7992/files/penuduzomemokidezibatub.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/7505/2454/files/munodivemonegexexak.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/2039/3380/files/basic_accounting_objective_type_questions_with_answers.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/2358/0835/files/14302816524.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000072bf.bin
a39d5bf440e53c7059ecc5695d9cf99808b4afa6749cf9087d82cde58efdb2fa
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x72BF 5476 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00008551.bin
9bda9d5a3988ce09805b682cb571c5f02fa793147833ccdf686c1e06cb08f567
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8551 10876 bytes