RTF malware analysis — malicious · 515a6e7e9e80e252

MALICIOUS

RTF

84.3 KB First seen: 2024-09-25

MD5: 1e292fc5072c6d4f7da9d33a3f0f3d82 SHA-1: 1feb6550b6482cfdbe848fbb516fab1d8c5da7c0 SHA-256: 515a6e7e9e80e25215fce93a677a0db76116c7505377a6a98e506f9f2c89bdec

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link

The sample is an RTF document containing an OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJAUTLINK, and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics strongly indicates exploitation of the Equation Editor component. This technique is commonly used to deliver secondary payloads, such as malware downloaders or droppers.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000ea5.bin` `1a1548dc458dc653f75d187d97cdbdd654b783c31d457bb53177551938f1c5ce`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xEA5	1487 bytes

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