Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 515763f1332d79dd…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

256.3 KB First seen: 2023-05-10
MD5: 3424cfffafbf86f25d6164cb52241760 SHA-1: d1a18db163281b84c296e4d10c1ce175a0ab3769 SHA-256: 515763f1332d79dd6fee5b07406230ba63985a00f4c68002480c2ffc9eaa4e2f
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with data indicative of the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces the activation of this object, leading to the exploitation of the Equation Editor. This technique is commonly used to achieve arbitrary code execution, often as a precursor to downloading and running a secondary payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001554.bin
75b2851f77c33e71b8e5b735c06ccd0203ebebdfa381f48964168bb1d64bed53
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1554 76008 bytes