Hancitor — Office (OOXML) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5134951dfe74a280…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

332.4 KB Created: 2021-02-11 13:34:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: b346a01d3398a728758895b1aaf2748b SHA-1: d1f569be335e637d6a43e859bd7969b9624e68e8 SHA-256: 5134951dfe74a2803ae255e7ba55e765fb16b1f212ecaa957aa612e304423ecd
380 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Hancitor · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1137.001 DLL Search Order Hijacking T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

This OOXML document contains VBA macros, including a Document_Open macro, which utilizes the Shell() function to execute a payload. The presence of an embedded OLE object with indicators for exploitation (CVE_2026_21514) and ClamAV detections of 'Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-9845854-0' strongly suggest this is a Hancitor variant designed to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 10

  • OOXML Ole10Native with payload/link indicators — possible CVE-2026-21514 high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Office document contains embedded OLE (word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin) with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. This is a likely CVE-2026-21514 exploitation shape.
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-9845854-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-9845854-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
e2f069c5310813efaacfdfdf5e4bc3d6c257dfd27593f6f4d9aa88e0dba8569d		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 4463 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
a965cff7303291a00ab2c327732911a4b9f5a43f71ad15c7c06975272f0e7941		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 345600 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
8e463badbaad3280d64eb08720ea130268e883b9903424c3d658e63b86c369c7		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 340307 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
f989327aa6e05b167fb3b9a3f2540c77939e1ead034d998f91c41f10e9dfed90		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 27648 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-9845854-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
emf_00.emf
2216f465bbee15e1b19206f5b77c4389784b520b43cc79d40d4c5d8133259fcd		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5804 bytes

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