Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 50e51f844a0653a8…

MALICIOUS

RTF

12.0 KB
MD5: efe63e09c4ad82e21ee9f63ed8d2f604 SHA-1: 92cdb0a86d559d8dbe9129fe2b41aeb09eb7b9bc SHA-256: 50e51f844a0653a83e215e03926f3569954fe02882cc07d127c1d8056edc7d5d
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains OLE object data and specifically triggers Equation Editor, indicating exploitation of a known vulnerability. The ".objupdate" heuristic suggests that the embedded OLE object is automatically activated upon opening. This is a common delivery mechanism for malware that aims to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001a71.bin
925ef3b9d42836b1d45e99c2ce16408a0694d058c2421cbf1556807514011aba
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1A71 1684 bytes