RTF malware analysis — malicious · 50c201f5a6577ba3

MALICIOUS

RTF

45.6 KB First seen: 2023-07-18

MD5: efb9c84739b1722573de55e574202c46 SHA-1: d8cc6702493d0903cb8cb259109072e1d1b3eb3e SHA-256: 50c201f5a6577ba3d171a019f584451486f19d532172790a9cdc6c923fcd983c

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, a known exploit technique. The SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic indicates the document prompts the user to enable editing, which would activate the OLE object and likely trigger the exploit. The embedded object is likely a secondary payload dropper.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00005883.bin` `18c1bd40b88fe4e9a435b47d55d80f54cffbfd6e5c67946f749506c982578983`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x5883	1826 bytes

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