Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 50baf3d3c8de9d9e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

865.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-08-17
MD5: a7eda515895a45e8461bdfb8bb1ac92f SHA-1: 6ee420decef0ce54d204e19bf49aa3c69e280917 SHA-256: 50baf3d3c8de9d9e8f6eb613da99e091554532caae01fc004aff6a576810fcbf
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-0199 indicates that this OLE file attempts to exploit a vulnerability to load a remote document from the URL http://104.168.46.25/FNF/1/00o0o0o0oO0O0OO00oo0oO0OOO00O0O000000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%2300000000000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%2300000000000.DOC. The presence of embedded PDF objects with suspicious findings further supports a multi-stage attack. No VBA macros were found to be executable, but the primary exploit vector is clear.

Heuristics 7

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • External URI low PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://104.168.46.25/FNF/1/00o0o0o0oO0O0OO00oo0oO0OOO00O0O000000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%2300000000000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%2300000000000.DOC
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • https://docs.microsoft.com/typography/abouthttp://lucasfonts.comMicrosoft
    • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIT_License
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crl0X
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crt0
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/MicCodSigPCA2011_2011-07-08.crl0a
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/certs/MicCodSigPCA2011_2011-07-08.crt0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/microsoftrootcert.crl0T
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftRootCert.crt0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicRooCerAut2011_2011_03_22.crl0^
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut2011_2011_03_22.crt0��
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/docs/primarycps.htm0@
    • http://www.microsoft.com/Typography
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttp://www.fonts.comMicrosoft
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/fonts/default.aspx

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
stream_005_off00004d68.bin
3a04212482833b3774fe0ffc48e74422d1c2095edcf5dc004e726e78a7f02320		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x4D68 157856 bytes
stream_008_off0001de20.bin
a331f0130458436cbeafe3d7e8403baa56e95a2f9a60704ce8b1a4e689f30906		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x1DE20 108760 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00044a00.pdf
da330fa54d533bb40b514f32a3665afa1d81174ffa2fa4c13ca8d9a631091204		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x44A00 604672 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00000e00.pdf
38b999c9fcce62e4d42078b65763e129908c4c9b5d3a35eedd0f84baeefbe34e		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE00 882176 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006200.pdf
f37d079ec39fbededeb4b0fdad5f63ec4c7c33e6d8d8d4ef710c1630ed9c0fff		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6200 860672 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0006f400.pdf
6a520098726b0177ff44e4618da0134415830e852669610deb1397b55cf0166a		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6F400 430080 bytes

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