Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 50b5e0f3edd80df7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

60.7 KB Created: 2021-05-29 09:48:05 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: b45e1f782073ff377fcca3412e01cd75 SHA-1: 09d7bbe468403d183a0ae76ceaf57103bc53039d SHA-256: 50b5e0f3edd80df7d866970de37101e4ea3ed0325c1659ce9fa16978952eff14
154 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a link farm pointing to compromised WordPress upload directories, a common technique for hosting malicious files. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent. The presence of multiple distinct hosts and links suggests an attempt to distribute or host malicious content, likely via a phishing lure.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9606

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.dyna-tech.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16094bc3fba705---rogidozorutikimomanivike.pdf
    • https://jjmassociates.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2dd9bf5b15247cd0a5498b9d397c6ed7/19270427745.pdf
    • https://dtcprojects.com.au/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ng1vvqj8o2pn69u7oie1tuap2q/muvavituduzomurexotabe.pdf
    • http://angelcabrera.com/FCKfiles/file/47476384344.pdf
    • http://www.christinemartin.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160adca2b8e0af---tokawojevamadu.pdf
    • http://pvsystreports.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/groij6o5achh5nkql1del83la0/70639106398.pdf
    • http://www.fotografoeventimilano.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16094ada8a33b5---ledozofibado.pdf
    • https://christembassybarking.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ef7bb6c3e90391639d536be9d0718602/zurukovin.pdf
    • https://businessservicesuk.com/userfiles/file/69626915819.pdf
    • http://www.consorcio.edu.pe/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a5f3db990d6---kofixopurutegifotezex.pdf
    • http://www.marcado.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160773c28e99ee---25604792184.pdf
    • http://bjoybrands.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607587d9410f2---wuvesunepirimamozexoge.pdf
    • http://kaufdeinauto.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607eeba42156c---rupisukelududupuz.pdf
    • https://www.nestroots.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/o8kd6nqc1gk7lhl9sbku20h0a3/87123650793.pdf
    • https://realestateconnect.pro/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4idjg5ss15thb5becu3molmkh7/82326612835.pdf
    • https://djhelaly.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/249f7f432c17b0acdea0725368264e15/kamovibok.pdf
    • https://webgirls-studio.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606f32567b829---14209875972.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/BkSY9tpko7c/uplcv?utm_term=professor+messer+course+notes+free
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c28a.bin
176de39b30201e15c0e747deeb252fdd75a4f91513ebabc65dd2b97e164e8ed5
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC28A 4784 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000d2be.bin
088fd32a48dea7439df0f1cbbdb477a52f2c3cbdbe663acd47c5fb998423c88f
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD2BE 10028 bytes