Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 50b24ebf51e2fa35…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

604.0 KB Created: 2002-05-07 13:35:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word 9.0 First seen: 2017-10-10
MD5: 3712fd0acc28c17a5147e280d3417954 SHA-1: 4584b25b995ee6356ae7ca870c2ad5cb8cb50d8d SHA-256: 50b24ebf51e2fa3530b24d3f58e7abfd58ec3a34613be65990e89c2acbdd604c
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is an OLE document with a significant amount of slack space, indicating potential obfuscation or embedded content. Crucially, it contains an embedded PE executable. The heuristics for LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress suggest that the document may be attempting to load and execute code, possibly from the embedded executable. The presence of the embedded executable is the primary indicator of malicious intent, suggesting it is intended to be delivered as an attachment.

Heuristics 4

  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 618,496 bytes but its declared streams total only 226,390 bytes — 392,106 bytes (63%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_00039000.exe embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x39000 385024 bytes
SHA-256: 31e1c6a47cd5ddb669e2604fe209c846f4785d50c591ca96e0af9fe08b88415e