Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 507b5f22ef4415aa…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.97 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 3e9fc2997aa752f1899daaa4635b2954 SHA-1: 0b0e604ae70a3c197098339754587832e6c07a41 SHA-256: 507b5f22ef4415aae7fc0d213b467322f82850b3456d7c841a5b76c037a46894
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.001 Malicious Link

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor, specifically targeting CVE-2017-8759. This vulnerability allows for the activation of OLE objects, leading to arbitrary code execution. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJEMB, RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR, RTF_OBJUPDATE, and CVE_2017_8759 heuristics strongly indicates an exploit attempt. The document body is heavily obfuscated and does not provide clear user-facing content, further suggesting a malicious payload delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off001ebacf.bin
9b3b76b1f0d4003b936adc2540e836bcd1951756cc944591fc834d2fc665ddfe		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1EBACF 3732 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.