Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5063e876bc7b657b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

87.6 KB Created: 2021-06-28 20:11:50 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2026-06-05
MD5: dd798578478dd1a01d93c66631f4244e SHA-1: 0f01dc292fa7109efbbb33e6084ef3d4e9763a0b SHA-256: 5063e876bc7b657bff0534429aa66acd017b1498ae7b22e726641d975d85f7f2
216 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript that likely attempts to redirect the user to malicious URLs hosted on compromised websites, as indicated by multiple PDF_URI and PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM heuristics. The embedded script itself is minimal, but the overall structure and URL patterns suggest a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier further support the malicious nature of the file.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9952

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://garglob.ru/uplcv?utm_term=kali+linux+assuring+security+by+penetration+testing+pdf PDF link annotation
    • http://stellamaris.cz/userfiles/90243417130.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lakeshoresmilesdentistry.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/fu50b6a87bfs5mg4f4hcme2lq3/witipanoroledibid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mattstergamer.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8t8g8u73an76k99paa18bq62ge/42460866417.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.rockandroll.blog.br/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/26d8i16a5bcr4j5lpnu2r7uf99/simomajex.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://samarpanbharat.org/trila/userfiles/file/jajebozikim.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zuche0551.com/upload/file/37624566992.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.fsnn.se/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606c94757c916---bipik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jetzterstrecht.hamburg/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ef7r4qq83ld7umj4rdv8q8atp9/giwozesozakemutodub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://travolution.travel/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c4f80e0ff8ff0085e362093b4d46bfaa/samazafolage.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://c2mag.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a086fb35e6f---77956282944.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aklond.com/UploadFilesfile///2021042917302886.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.ikedatosou.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b0754c8686d---xisarisi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://goergenpainting.com/clients/0/0d/0d1038892961fdbf96b6a8e7e8daca8f/File/bubit.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://htfcompact.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/72cf5ca0a5ea83ad7faa2b9b6d95ce2c/32060052784.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://chicagoportablexray.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606fff33b02da---topaledefevu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://go-trec.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8jqb4kuaur0aij0e94t7v2hhtr/jufalowedowadudumomogidiw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://goldnumber.info/userfiles/file/74001890592.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://suemsas.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/bvnccivd1nv4g9bcsjunsdjoc0/26008657057.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.projectorrentals.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ba5ac1aedd4---87612785994.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bnovum.hu/downloads/pewulixegokififow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.optionassurance.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607bd9a9c5c78---40849557340.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aliancegroup.su/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607678471bef0---17987500348.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://premium-house.uz/images/file/84281212769.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_0001593b.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x1593B 1653 bytes
SHA-256: 5144ba81e3e6dad96a5db24949718df364300863d7bba31d3c790c66c445022f
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='Pdftk'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Pisodemo Tabibi</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Kali linux assuring security by penetration testing pdf.        Windows PowerShell is a scripting language that simplifies Windows system administration. Pow</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Kali linux assuring security by penetration testing pdf.        Windows PowerShell is a scripting language that simplifies Windows system administration. Pow</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Kali linux assuring security by penetration testing pdf</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='Pdftk'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-01-03T18:43:24'
  xmp:CreatorTool='Pdftk'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='02183905-c663-494d-9a89-043d8fcc061b'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='d7b57c50-6e66-47af-b8c2-6bedc16dc2bd'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000efd1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEFD1 11240 bytes
SHA-256: 3580e65efe45afb1a9dff94828015bcb4e05e0e5e07fec82a1be969adb7b3999
font_01_sfnt_off000109e7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x109E7 17292 bytes
SHA-256: b102c6e7727605927a3baee17ddac1c40230fa0d6d4b68519f27273c0ef53c8b
font_02_sfnt_off00013707.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13707 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.