Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 504e2291b327548d…

MALICIOUS

RTF

17.3 KB First seen: 2018-09-04
MD5: dc0af60c69808159b920e4bff3baae27 SHA-1: 99073d9210be6768d50616049e1fdd5ad582c585 SHA-256: 504e2291b327548d8b12e4806bdf7de2c28a115729be53b97e057e88e2f41a40
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains heuristics indicating the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 via an embedded OLE object. This vulnerability is commonly used to execute arbitrary code, suggesting the file's primary purpose is to deliver a malicious payload. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA and RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM further supports the embedding of executable content.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 likely critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    RTF decodes to an activated Microsoft Equation 3.0 OLE storage whose payload is a high-entropy Ole10Native stream rather than normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is a weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape consistent with CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802.
  • Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000ef2.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xEF2 4645 bytes
SHA-256: cb0dd5e553bd3f71a8414c4f08c1c5720608dbc1540d0c66ad6279c50992d24d