Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 504dc16acf49be1c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

72.8 KB Created: 2021-02-15 21:54:16 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-18
MD5: 5d2d7b1fd0d81266e06d9987f4ddc1f1 SHA-1: 9950b5715cfc16d8e9bf7b677244d78625868b15 SHA-256: 504dc16acf49be1cf9ee4d6f6d065877bdb2782cd739318728bac95a0b2775b4
226 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file is identified as malicious by multiple heuristics and an ML classifier, specifically flagged as a phishing trojan. It contains numerous external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or redirection mechanism. The heuristic 'SE_REMOTE_SUPPORT_LURE' indicates the document likely attempts to trick the user into installing or connecting with remote support software, a common tactic for social engineering attacks.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9996

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Remote-support tool lure high SE_REMOTE_SUPPORT_LURE
    Document instructs the user to install, open, or connect with a remote-support tool such as AnyDesk, TeamViewer, Quick Assist, or ScreenConnect — high-risk in an unsolicited document
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://maypoin.ru/wix?keyword=fancy+font+generator+for+discord PDF link annotation
    • https://gobunelesivuwol.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132303092/nunamizurozulugujeb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/fomeluxilim/hjcmaSY/interlocked_hands_logo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/jigugabopu/cDzjcUq/926864841.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/salefudodid/CvhfgcQ/26823327671.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wixevilit.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134873569/nawux.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gonuvogizup.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857562/regadazabamoki_kezala.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/pixazizaze/1kHia40/sudofawexuzawusegu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/sanevujaguda/6iepMih/84756481708.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vazoguzo/6gczygf/syberia_2_game_download_for_android.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gubagomokugexat.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/9/133988684/4696967.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/wujakegu/ihwjfzh/lobby_design_plan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/xerolunem/f04jh0z/zugizizowuj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vobulesije.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857334/4652660.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/wobuwozavenu/56geBig/funny_animal_pics_memes.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/dugibabafod/rinobobulim.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://galapeb.epizy.com/adobe_acrobat_reader_installer.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zarevizebi/10714490702.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vajefam/german_translation_worksheets.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jixerubowi/pezuzemigotaduwizumibuvu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gizogebinide.rf.gd/supesakojiludijobef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dusuvoparujizoj.rf.gd/coronary_artery_atheroma_formation_steps.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fonaxipovun.epizy.com/arquitectura_moderna_en_el_peru.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e230.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE230 5216 bytes
SHA-256: 2d92f69189a346c297b745a4ff42103e863ac9f72bd615ebc897aa6473daa149
font_01_sfnt_off0000f40b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF40B 9940 bytes
SHA-256: 45a316d08d68629645ec3dabd978a1282ced8025493e98a67b796342148a5f3a