Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5048f6d082e0d5f7…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

39.2 KB First seen: 2023-05-17
MD5: cc2649e4dc75645d353675c83c6a0f1b SHA-1: 192338d4067d3a464eba4411839d4cd18eaede32 SHA-256: 5048f6d082e0d5f7457cbdda995327619dd9c8cb131c891842141d805e2056a1
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an RTF document exploiting the Equation Editor vulnerability (RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR). It contains a lure to 'Enable editing' and macros, a common technique for malware droppers. The embedded OLE object data and the specific heuristic firings strongly suggest exploitation of a known Equation Editor flaw to execute arbitrary code.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004fa9.bin
8c14aef9163f1241579193e9dcb37d6838427a1c15017f6801fbc9f9c14be479
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4FA9 1841 bytes