Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 503bf8961936fefb…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

103.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-03-23
MD5: 7cdc9ed168ac5eb1adb254af0fccc4db SHA-1: 64e1bc93c7fec9e8d9b3d76432b2abc978cc2774 SHA-256: 503bf8961936fefb5778a07dcc8ca7deab5949d9934a8ee8e610bed1df81a7ba
70 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing indicates exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE2Link object, which is designed to download and execute a remote payload. The embedded URL points to a suspicious domain and IP address, likely serving as the initial stage of the attack. No VBA macros were found to be executable, but the exploit itself is sufficient for initial compromise.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://OASOSIDFOSWEROEROOWRWERWEREWWW0W83W338W83WOWRWWRWRWRW9W9R9W9R9WR9W9RW9R9W9R9W9R0WR7RR7W7RW7RRW7R66WSD6DSD6S6D6DSD66D6S@154.22.40.229/97..........................97....................doc

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes