Office (OOXML) malware analysis — malicious · 501ac08ebac64651

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

95.5 KB Created: 2020-05-11 22:35:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 12.0000 First seen: 2020-06-01

MD5: 97fa1f66bd2b2f8a34aafe5a374996f8 SHA-1: 7fb3218b1ca76c379e08e7ce4942c2ead4c1e115 SHA-256: 501ac08ebac646517b00d3234dfe58837b460bd5f045822d9fb5999f00979bfe

102 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1129 Shared Content

The sample is a Microsoft Office document containing an embedded OLE object. Heuristics indicate this object is likely an executable payload, potentially exploiting CVE-2026-21514. The embedded OLE object and associated extracted files suggest the document is designed to deliver and execute a secondary malicious payload upon opening.

Heuristics 4

Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE

OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT

Document contains an embedded OLE object
Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006 In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`ooxml_oleobject_00.bin`	ooxml-ole-object	OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin	151040 bytes
SHA-256: `0fb944c778076917aa16c38dc4b633082834f27514702a9f49051b04b33fdbe3`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
`ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin`	ole-package	OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native	147337 bytes
SHA-256: `6666a0cd95b888af4f0bf7dbb2059c0d3d07f89f86aa782dabc895f7b4412ac2`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
`emf_00.emf`	ooxml-emf	OOXML EMF part: word/media/image1.emf	5420 bytes
SHA-256: `60f49c0f13dde5144d36e5aac693dda0b46977d351edc05595f20f141f64b4c8`

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