Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 501882c22fe82e05…

MALICIOUS

PDF

134.7 KB Created: 2021-06-26 16:16:58 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 0a7d216734b40c90cb3fd6e9717c7ba0 SHA-1: abed04213839a1652219c290de1378e59211460a SHA-256: 501882c22fe82e05d8f6a316064aba425a75cc59456a3fc29ff4fe193826fd4e
216 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

This PDF document exhibits characteristics of a phishing lure, impersonating a cloud document service to trick users. It contains a heuristic indicating a lure for clipboard command execution, suggesting the user is prompted to copy and paste commands into a shell. The presence of numerous links to compromised CMS upload storage and disposable hosting further supports a malicious intent, likely to redirect users to malicious sites or download further payloads. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and heuristics point towards a phishing or malware delivery mechanism.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9768

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Cloud document impersonation lure medium SE_CLOUD_DOC_LURE
    Document impersonates a cloud file-sharing service such as SharePoint, OneDrive, Google Drive, Dropbox, Box, or Microsoft 365 and asks the user to open, verify, or access a shared document
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://reifenscho.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16092bb2f58e36---12005298867.pdf
    • http://studioagm.it/userfiles/files/28837940958.pdf
    • http://rasmesafar.net/basefile/basefiles/78040253030.pdf
    • https://yziact.fr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/pg5n1f4s156nm4oiofjl4rnfpu/xefijoporomime.pdf
    • http://shsalumniauditorium.org/clients/f/fa/fa32e32112b7cad64a7d7e78b95ed61b/File/70308954407.pdf
    • http://waterreducer.cn/d/files/kaxanakamosa.pdf
    • http://jockmurray.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607b257820ba1---6739483902.pdf
    • http://gramercygrand.ru/files/file/53056960711.pdf
    • https://baconbites.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/pp6r2uig6s8fc2e4dmquvlj767/xuninejetetubup.pdf
    • https://sharzh-ufa.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5307ff20b5faf74f7a272cf096d9d5f1/tibabafedawabuzobejedif.pdf
    • http://smithmurdock.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c03495828a3---85297138668.pdf
    • http://duetsepolno.pl/userfiles/file/sijudowuzatiba.pdf
    • https://www.inter-tube.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/149ab5355e7bad06378946ac363f3361/sewasevagono.pdf
    • https://trucraftsmanship.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609fca387dbdd---kumuregobozolowir.pdf
    • http://szentistvanpatika.hu/upload/file/16707632046.pdf
    • http://heninrealty.com/userfiles/files/63520578462.pdf
    • https://newat.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9fdc01005096d6b8b9b130bd0d3c3905/49441829540.pdf
    • https://vashadvokat82.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d7f06086a04dfc274536971b7c21009e/60566700947.pdf
    • http://sunarfactory.com/userfiles/files/nasosutejaxezok.pdf
    • https://ventana-sur.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607dee0841afc.pdf
    • http://botosani.ro/img/uploads/file/witenupusojigakop.pdf
    • https://dutchfansitenetwork.nl/ckfinder/userfiles/files/menopi.pdf
    • https://www.kadinlarsitesi.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16085c370b024c---18772856982.pdf
    • https://steklo-shik.ru/userfiles/file/35345660079.pdf
    • https://otdelkamos.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ffb2e0fd12c8d1eaed527692fbbd8710/64911534576.pdf
    • http://klingende-zeder.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607d50fa5e235---7252717740.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/A3Ryygt5BCM/uplcv?utm_term=wow+special+characters
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0001913b.bin
3593325e802b729f72e0344a2b902585e0b2994f75f9b8f6be4db670e75c012a		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1913B 33972 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0001dd62.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1DD62 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0001f579.bin
8d46e3730b7c6afcd470be04a4e8c12072e949fafb963db6891a573f052ee9e5		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1F579 10444 bytes

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