Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 50125e9be1790395…

MALICIOUS

PDF

75.8 KB Created: 2021-06-10 02:09:35 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-02
MD5: 0a0278da0d079337bdf51fefaf1f8c1f SHA-1: 88d4a1af1073dd849c40c76b0f589570b67e2e1a SHA-256: 50125e9be1790395d8d24ec61807b1b4fb2acf2de5f5ecd8f95c22f881bf9fbf
256 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier. It contains multiple links to external sites, some of which appear to be compromised WordPress installations. Crucially, the document employs social engineering tactics, specifically a 'ClickFix' lure, instructing the user to copy and paste commands into their system's execution contexts. This strongly suggests an attempt to bypass macro restrictions and directly execute a malicious payload, likely downloaded from one of the provided URLs.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://pixomot.ru/uplcv?utm_term=checkra1n+icloud+bypass+activator+2020 PDF link annotation
    • https://isleo.com/i_photos/file/peruxowatowasom.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://akcjonariusz.com/UserFiles/file/1675407124.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://oneremote.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5f6ed65bdf83419b286935b91fb49a49/sasimaj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://qualitycountscleaning.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/14f7e40e991cd6ad23b297c026029d82/11280618201.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.fmworks.com.tr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d7im1krv33j9gcqmnqmlflknqb/13611895517.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vashadvokat82.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d575e9d908c1c05f80e81fa651d93d0e/tavugoda.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tuabogadoangel.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b4748f33132ef5391dd8c50cabfa3ecb/malizenilufaxizuvufajeb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://79.170.40.182/boothtastic.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ab2ce4c9786---komodemojov.pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://www.ncstarim.com.tr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/86tp541gepnalg0ci8muhjbsb0/90991495328.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.chortho.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/82q5eacq8tnau83q8ieo6ju4ga/76938436036.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://saludocupacionalpso.com/home/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160758108c210b---41139378271.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.grecosalesinternational.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a9b55ceeb09---68561962329.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.anieliasfx.com/uploads/textareas/file/dowatipojunu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://totaleclipsenv.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160aaedfae8992---fajinujadaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rusiuojigalvoji.lt/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160781ef3c24db---goviwezafibaxezoraj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://camile.vn/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ie64sqbtfe8sf2be6lasipgb48/xusidudatujibare.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e761.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE761 5760 bytes
SHA-256: 9c815b6f67f295b66669e717739b243ebf320b722654cda14146c39742a841ff
font_01_sfnt_off0000faf8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFAF8 11388 bytes
SHA-256: 2b5a88574b2df1b450a56bcbefd81e9c21b1e9d0bee024048e344814400be4e1

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