Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 500dde5093c757b1…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

174.9 KB Created: 2018-08-13 15:37:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-02-04
MD5: e448964bc8ed71b3815f48ac717c0651 SHA-1: 83c869ff5e1bfeb645ee677550e523b4da308d51 SHA-256: 500dde5093c757b1c464be6358c9e638f92a5e86c92b4edc2588b45b1421a1ee
62 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic

The presence of the OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC heuristic indicates a legacy WordBasic macro, likely designed to run automatically when the document is opened. The large slack space in the OLE structure is also suspicious. No specific IOCs were extracted, and the document body was heavily truncated and unreadable.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 179,072 bytes but its declared streams total only 103,747 bytes — 75,325 bytes (42%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

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