Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4ffdca2da7d05e72…

MALICIOUS

RTF

94.3 KB First seen: 2024-07-09
MD5: 5b0dd974cf8e8acb01cf8385284dac1f SHA-1: 56a497f7588e4eeacc1d296f1dc5c3c40bd75baa SHA-256: 4ffdca2da7d05e72321b7fd09629969a9095bb7dfd7bf901b270fd2d8380ee08
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains OLE object data and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability, indicating exploitation for client execution. The presence of \objupdate suggests that the embedded OLE object is designed to activate automatically. While no specific payload or URL was directly extracted, the nature of the exploit strongly implies a downloader or dropper functionality.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000016c1.bin
165281b72925c341bf1037e579a463baac723ab878736413ddfdf22a1c733fae
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x16C1 1795 bytes