Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4feea6d3f9c62a89…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

27.1 KB First seen: 2023-04-24
MD5: f91e287d6e638f244e470cd57bbf3b72 SHA-1: 48f5b5d7d2a9c39753dd83acb6abfe8f65e55468 SHA-256: 4feea6d3f9c62a894c7dd5661c14c0c1bf6d897356d16de74375c01c44acb735
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an RTF document that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) to execute code. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates the document likely contains a prompt to enable editing or macros, a common social engineering tactic. The presence of OLE object data and automatic linking further supports the exploitation of embedded objects within the RTF structure. The specific exploit and delivery mechanism point towards a downloader or initial access payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002123.bin
2087401f8dbd9f9b65f630ac7ce76478229d350a35472e6cbeb560771125ac68
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2123 1511 bytes