Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4fb0e030553398ac…

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.8 KB Created: 2020-08-30 21:53:14 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: efeba156f3a4c88808cc00f90b0d660f SHA-1: f5a799ad3727d24d35175272bda8fb59b6c58347 SHA-256: 4fb0e030553398ac73d6f09d32c8d4ed60a2aed6c65689a2c3a716e52974ea50
130 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file contains embedded links, one of which points to a known malicious redirector. The document body text, though partially corrupted, includes keywords related to 'accounts payable clerk training' and a URL, suggesting a lure to trick users into clicking the malicious link. The presence of a link farm heuristic further indicates an attempt to distribute malicious content.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wix?keyword=accounts+payable+clerk+training+manu
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/1673/2320/files/68481102221.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9291/8947/files/16080962444.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/8945/9368/files/73863253532.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/9159/0308/files/32919013009.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/1784/6432/files/guide_lego_star_wars.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/7259/3832/files/jomebabizuzemejukakufimi.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/a76634_f288625e6eab4995bfd8c6b87f652250.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_0e01b7c56bd34eb08c01759e7358265c.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/0cd3a8_6633717c8c1d47ec95dd7df863ffdc76.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/90423f_adfeb57cdea64cb2abd11106cb4c75a3.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b58d21_c3d0063915c04f13847eb29e54227ea6.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_b1ed68ff68d54656877f64cb1e053e6b.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_c401025e64504dfaa7d7ab5a1dde594b.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005feb.bin
ad9f3336011a099ff870219f0b76c10f41696ccd046c9bb6e42efcab876104ea		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5FEB 5548 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000072ba.bin
1d0067942d3f6a3e5887f971d51c5bc24bd8a19864d4c58f470bd83e6dfb0212		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x72BA 10548 bytes

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