Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4fa607d7dbb9378f…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.3 KB
MD5: 9694f3b81157286656b59fb14722b45d SHA-1: a0a5544b5447f2641175d521427c94fa3b40870d SHA-256: 4fa607d7dbb9378fe5ac7b357bc3b746e08c2e52e67e13f5cfd450d08363e557
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive forces the activation of the embedded OLE object, which is a known technique for exploiting the Equation Editor vulnerability to achieve arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000009b.bin
e8af287d826febe7a09d668f4b0cab27d8e2d7676dad138c2818b84fa2671309
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x9B 1897 bytes