Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4fa606716d72b40f…

MALICIOUS

RTF

116.5 KB First seen: 2024-09-12
MD5: 2fe621a8e829c243bbf2c1840cdebedc SHA-1: c06596e08264a891d918a37bcbd21461240ddd5f SHA-256: 4fa606716d72b40fb9878f94b65a626e3f9902450b0e1428ecbaff3f4349e858
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: User Execution: Malicious File

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of malicious OLE object usage, specifically targeting the Equation Editor. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR`, `RTF_OBJAUTLINK`, `RTF_OBJUPDATE`, and `RTF_OBJDATA` heuristics strongly suggests an exploit targeting a known vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. This exploit is designed to execute arbitrary code, likely to download and run a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000201f.bin
155852d609854227b84ae3dc8628b64b3109d1b1bf0b460c8b3a79984add6159
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x201F 2046 bytes