RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 4f7d203feb6dedb3

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

375.3 KB

MD5: eecdb99cad3df6ec6da36e2b7a12de92 SHA-1: 7701c97a61521d78abd8fe4ee11b504fcded854d SHA-256: 4f7d203feb6dedb3c6dfe4a7000e7e0fb77f8510f3ee3922d096694aed93624f

180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple OLE object data sections and uses ".objupdate" to force OLE activation, indicating it's designed to execute embedded content. The document body explicitly instructs the user to 'download the document and click Enable Editing', a common lure for macro-based malware. No specific scripts were extracted, but the OLE object activation strongly suggests the execution of a secondary payload.

Heuristics 6

Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED

RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000965.bin` `98daef6383b33106bdd64ddb1b409bc2c050450c0a60fddda0d9bfe53faed3ee`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x965	79784 bytes
`objdata_01_off00007114.bin` `575c341755e659d8c9f7e6cc752c9ce136164d9e6a6218e55fb2fd3b0adf8cc5`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x7114	79757 bytes
`objdata_02_off0002f9bb.bin` `a8e170497da15decc11753d202c99c86f7a7ffd2d52481e6b9c79a5403675379`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2F9BB	2632 bytes
`objdata_03_off00030f5e.bin` `e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x30F5E	12297 bytes

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