Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4f09e9ba8ad40f72…

MALICIOUS

PDF

91.9 KB Created: 2020-11-18 08:02:37 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 22208dece1ef4d9332173320e0e73cfa SHA-1: bd1c248a5e2a4008699dad69267cd8e954cada8b SHA-256: 4f09e9ba8ad40f720f885012400dc20987ebae5d775b4d51a9cb36bddbc45b2e
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier. It contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or phishing operation. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains references to "date now vba format" and the authoring application "wkhtmltopdf", indicating a potential lure to external content. The presence of numerous external URIs and the link farm heuristic strongly suggest an attempt to redirect users to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffnew.ru/aws?utm_term=date+now+vba+format
    • https://nakofasojerurog.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134592478/jarofo-wexuzetuxajuwu-rivoxojanu.pdf
    • https://nipefewemaxu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134387654/dd10d3982c4677.pdf
    • https://pirizujimo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134454944/xilinigufivina-vezovemixapadot-xelapagurupizaw-nofasil.pdf
    • https://xapotaligefako.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134612972/xatevexo.pdf
    • https://xadaxegaku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134444747/dakarire.pdf
    • https://mulelene.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134440938/dikuzudoxe-mupasakuwos-rifigamisisa.pdf
    • https://jinokafolamod.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134310646/7c6eea8562af9b1.pdf
    • https://lupilizeranal.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134460298/tufuxomivanoxe_difedudozipidu.pdf
    • https://likotemeg.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134464786/7059952.pdf
    • https://dobopekajami.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134314215/6181c.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/purixifusipelid/weight_calculation_formula.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/0337179b-f89e-4414-ab72-52275a487fd9/running_fred_unblocked_76.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xanunafojuloki/599543898.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/9346dcc1-2359-4425-a5d7-84314d8d06e0/galujonobewimazisejun.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00011ddf.bin
02dcb42b6a1e778531af90bd8f31d1ec350635889b3880860c380088456ca0d8		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11DDF 4736 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00012df1.bin
773ef8428a62909ddb3dc32592bd2eccc0381e60a6b0aefb421708a04181100d		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12DF1 11356 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00015461.bin
1158d95dac44631f497756703988ba3645251422e7ff0015d3fca430225e7c3e		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x15461 4324 bytes

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