Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4ef7c1a780f4fd20…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

309.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-05-24
MD5: 5d97b2ea32b0dbefc204ce0d553e7353 SHA-1: c14a4719e584a2769e0c599ec7af9c13e4e7ffe9 SHA-256: 4ef7c1a780f4fd2099e5cb7b9a3d9ffa77ea04c8326307f524df83d2afd31a91
112 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing indicates the sample exploits CVE-2017-0199 using a URL moniker to load a remote resource. The embedded URL points to a potential second-stage payload. The presence of multiple duplicate PDF objects within the embedded PDF suggests obfuscation or packing techniques. No VBA macros were found to be executable, but the primary exploit vector is clear.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://109.248.144.230/if/ifififfifififii%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23ifififif.doc

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00011600.pdf
ee26889a055b2f2899dff9b89e7403c4d7802a20b9bdde448cdd6f1ac1c3f091		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x11600 245760 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00015e00.pdf
1724587beeb03b98bbd6794eef7adc2a954b318dbb2c5413b3ac303dfce8cf60		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x15E00 227328 bytes

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