Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4eeae6113403d4e9…

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.02 MB First seen: 2019-05-16
MD5: f4e08198f3de9542178fc894671a4527 SHA-1: 82bbd1479ecff2ae7ad33883b243b2b1b5b319ef SHA-256: 4eeae6113403d4e9909b29ba284d8310972c90b9ea4821cf6a054626cd427e48
222 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains multiple OLE objects and exhibits characteristics of CVE-2017-8570, specifically a composite moniker. This indicates the file is designed to exploit this vulnerability to drop and execute a script, likely a second-stage payload. The embedded URLs are mostly related to certificate authorities and appear benign, providing no direct IOCs for the payload itself.

Heuristics 7

  • Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE related CVE_2017_8570
    RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1054KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 9 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://secure.comodo.net/CPS0C In RTF body
    • http://ocsp.comodoca.com0In RTF body
    • http://ocsp.digicert.com0AIn RTF body
    • http://ocsp.digicert.com0CIn RTF body
    • http://test1.ru/newbuild/t.php?act=hitIn RTF body
    • http://crl.comodoca.com/COMODORSACodeSigningCA.crl0tIn RTF body
    • http://crt.comodoca.com/COMODORSACodeSigningCA.crt0$In RTF body
    • http://crl.comodoca.com/COMODORSACertificationAuthority.crl0qIn RTF body
    • http://crt.comodoca.com/COMODORSAAddTrustCA.crt0$In RTF body
    • https://www.digicert.com/CPS0�In RTF body
    • http://crl3.digicert.com/DigiCertAssuredIDCA-1.crl08�6�4�2http://crl4.digicert.com/DigiCertAssuredIDCA-1.crl0wIn RTF body
    • http://cacerts.digicert.com/DigiCertAssuredIDCA-1.crt0In RTF body
    • http://www.digicert.com/ssl-cps-repository.htm0�In RTF body
    • http://cacerts.digicert.com/DigiCertAssuredIDRootCA.crt0��In RTF body
    • http://crl3.digicert.com/DigiCertAssuredIDRootCA.crl0:�8�6�4http://crl4.digicert.com/DigiCertAssuredIDRootCA.crl0In RTF body
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordmlIn RTF body

Extracted artifacts 8

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000025.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x25 205 bytes
SHA-256: 980870ba17beb12f03c3941a0cfa655d820816cec9104090156a6ea6ece5ce8a
objdata_01_off000001ee.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1EE 406499 bytes
SHA-256: 2b6660eb80f32c282052cd4dee72712edfe5ec510627612395b76859cc7f9bfe
objdata_02_off000f116d.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xF116D 1004 bytes
SHA-256: de57d2083ef5e021ec705be7e3dd4b0e90d1d2f7950e0bc7ffde2709f639f965
objdata_03_off000f197e.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xF197E 32665 bytes
SHA-256: 7bc9ec1f0f651f44d55c29c2418a62c6073ac32e2c7b9aaefcfd115ed3f57211
objdata_04_off001018e8.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1018E8 359 bytes
SHA-256: 357be353baa88dc3743707bade3b7e68e8e017f02553817dd77495fda9a64957
objdata_05_off00101bf2.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x101BF2 866 bytes
SHA-256: 5d0695c0b0c9feed62b1faa3e75242a3007ac483afd76a69c04e9ed6b9541365
objdata_06_off00102334.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x102334 2633 bytes
SHA-256: fe11c27d916ab897eb94064e9631d8a29c847a6db39259bef31578da8d19fdf5
objdata_07_off0010384c.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x10384C 2601 bytes
SHA-256: 67ff079a9b0f053ca2843811d9da7a8fdedc7d9d377ef39d09dde148b9657c7f

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