Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4ee293e4ae33e2db…

MALICIOUS

PDF

37.0 KB Created: 2020-08-17 12:20:22 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 02f1cd2d2782e3d2494418bb81110570 SHA-1: 1e9b07809f0785706eb1f752e05ae2a2527f5942 SHA-256: 4ee293e4ae33e2dbd50654fc432a84dfc11e2b796cb5f724717451a7ed4ffce6
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains a link farm and a specific malicious redirector URL, indicating a phishing attempt disguised as a financial transfer form. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains the malicious URL and references to financial forms. The presence of numerous external PDF links suggests an attempt to distribute malicious content or engage in SEO manipulation for phishing. No scripts were extracted from this sample.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=barclays+chaps+transfer+form
    • http://files.ucblbsa.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383330/1938064.pdf
    • http://ketubodep.jakzandhoney.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814995/buduwi_lobokizi_menujadedi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/3840/7845/files/dupopelaxoxi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/2354/0124/files/15392055757.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/1605/2126/files/zobigewegamu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/5911/7206/files/92466529482.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/7386/3842/files/rumilizekez.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0447/7979/8679/files/annuity_guide.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/9508/9559/files/56917970468.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/4940/9960/files/kannada_8d_audio_songs_free.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/6810/2558/files/2014_army_navy_game_uniforms.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/6624/4766/files/2002_toyota_tacoma_repair_manual.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000054a6.bin
01187c34b532b370fe81e04088f4419da4e33cde4810d434005e5cff85b9abe2		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x54A6 5408 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000066e2.bin
900a9a1f25f8ebccf8c99e47889729b2ee5d2d7136eb90776b00c774dbcdeb38		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x66E2 9652 bytes

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