Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4edebbc23c1a50e2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.7 KB Created: 2020-10-16 06:35:49 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-04
MD5: a5d9a9e93b95975d9629c0939540edbf SHA-1: 72dada363c0621003004531fa028942b75bbe49d SHA-256: 4edebbc23c1a50e292a9152b726876ee1247097bf667f07c49ec8dd97761181c
184 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=packard+bell+easynote+te69kb+user+manual In PDF document text
    • https://zisokilusativ.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132303079/vunogewamedozen.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jakedekokobara.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381480/8536469.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tugajepefur.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453805/5436432.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ruwopevod.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131397973/fosiri-vasulex.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1048567.mozfiles.com/files/1048567/97356096798.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037026.mozfiles.com/files/1037026/dixakebuvifo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1038927.mozfiles.com/files/1038927/94478692242.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jemiwuwavaza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814288/tigosorivibisakoxu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wefolukozik.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406413/fuzejidoziw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1040238.mozfiles.com/files/1040238/51612210341.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1040988.mozfiles.com/files/1040988/42269670999.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037156.mozfiles.com/files/1037156/nuzod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1040251.mozfiles.com/files/1040251/santander_mobile_banking_app_android_download.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1040319.mozfiles.com/files/1040319/7424827259.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/3421/3538/files/universal_ac_remote_control_apk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/2b837a8a-976e-470c-92bb-a40873ffb709/20139354918.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/37496832-a62c-4a4e-8a35-4ef3b833f130/vavofizi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f7c54eb7-4770-4af8-83d9-16abeb29bc5f/fexisosupo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c728fe2e-80e9-443b-8210-c1a62dc3702f/1091916549.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00004bcb.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4BCB 5536 bytes
SHA-256: 94b97ad50385e3eb2d4d586c7040fd7d086792200db4f003e0abc3b6619c0777
font_01_sfnt_off00005e83.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5E83 11284 bytes
SHA-256: b4b9b652b849677eccfcea46422b3049aa81d706dd105da53137ca8afb24984f
font_02_sfnt_off0000833e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x833E 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 9f355172d696dda274cac500966718f112ce76951f19577ac4888987ea6471b2