Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4eab5bd1b26ff844…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.1 KB
MD5: bdfc4ab7554c0d5de3f54a383af35147 SHA-1: 9b2bee3712b78e219f0d9402b3512b87317c1e30 SHA-256: 4eab5bd1b26ff844995fb018cd784a9167d5120d8bd962ef81d69fe1eea4cbaa
136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: Malicious PDF T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

This PDF document exploits the CVE-2010-0188 vulnerability in Adobe Reader, specifically targeting XFA forms. The embedded script payload, likely JavaScript given the XFA context, is designed to leverage this exploit. The primary goal appears to be the execution of arbitrary code, potentially leading to further compromise.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
9d70116a6b624569f7bc1d1743a7c9f972044e39f1fad201171e96b5574acef0
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 80273 bytes