Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4ea9702175304da4…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCM

18.6 KB Created: 2024-07-24 09:09:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000 First seen: 2024-07-29
MD5: ad557ccbde010d0b02ab9233eca8e2f8 SHA-1: 0bf1184581a8aca5e792eedc525cf3ca6696a45c SHA-256: 4ea9702175304da45da92995a0165d7d14ccb9963b086895923ff105f64d673f
290 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is a macro-enabled document (DOCM) that utilizes a Document_Open macro to execute malicious code. The macro attempts to download a second-stage executable from the URL "https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/1265592680700711006/1265595644031270992/VVCGHHDYTR.exe?ex=66a2154b&is=66a0c3cb&hm=9935ad5bc1809f433d2cb81e4a36dea7a9b4a898c7a33ace01437a98095b4a22&" and save it to the temporary directory as "downloaded_file.exe". The use of Shell() and CreateObject() calls, along with the HTTP download and execution pattern, strongly indicates a downloader functionality.

Heuristics 9

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/1265592680700711006/1265595644031270992/VVCGHHDYTR.exe?ex=66a2154b&is=66a0c3cb&hm=9935ad5bc1809f433d2cb81e4a36dea7a9b4a898c7a33ace01437a98095b4a22&
    • https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/1265592680700711006/1265595644031270992/VVCGHHDYTR.exe?ex=66a2154b&is=66a0c3cb&hm=9935ad5bc1809f433d2cb81e4a36dea7a9b4a898c7a33ace01437a98095b4a22&�
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
bad9f62ac721a367057e1f0332c82e0ff13f5d8f85a2129056d3f1c5a800f0f7		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2378 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
2b80d43a85bc140ce439bb1c55679cfa5cf397bded661eb4b4dd5e471cd144fb		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 14848 bytes

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